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ABSTRACT
We consider technology-assisted mimicry attacks in the context of
automatic speaker verification (ASV). We use ASV itself to select
targeted speakers to be attacked by human-based mimicry. We
recorded 6 naive mimics for whom we select target celebrities from
VoxCeleb1 and VoxCeleb2 corpora (7,365 potential targets) using
an i-vector system. The attacker attempts to mimic the selected
target, with the utterances subjected to ASV tests using an indepen-
dently developed x-vector system. Our main finding is negative:
even if some of the attacker scores against the target speakers were
slightly increased, our mimics did not succeed in spoofing the x-
vector system. Interestingly, however, the relative ordering of the
selected targets (closest, furthest, median) are consistent between
the systems, which suggests some level of transferability between
the systems.
Index Terms— Speaker verification, mimicry, spoofing
1. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that representation attacks [1, 2] — also known
as spoofing attacks — cast a shadow over the security of biomet-
ric systems. A spoofing attack involves an adversary (attacker) who
aims at masquerading oneself as another targeted user to gain ille-
gitimate access. Unprotected automatic speaker verification (ASV)
systems can easily be spoofed using replay, voice conversion and
text-to-speech attacks [3]. This has sparked research into spoofing
countermeasures aimed at detecting the attacks from given audio.
Community-driven benchmarks such as ASVspoof [4] and AVspoof
[5] were launched for an organized study of countermeasures. In the
context of security, continual arms race between attacks and their de-
fenses is well known [6]: to develop effective countermeasures, it is
necessary to understand the attacks. The speech synthesis commu-
nity has independently launched voice conversion challenge [7, 8]
to advance VC methods. Within the past few years, active and dy-
namic communities both at the ‘attack’ and ‘defense’ sides of ASV,
focused on technological attacks, have emerged.
In this study we focus on a nearly-forgotten ASV attack –
mimicry (impersonation). Unlike the technology-induced attacks,
mimicry involves human-based modification of one’s voice produc-
tion. The question of recognizer vulnerability against mimicry was
addressed at least around half a century ago [9, 10] and has remained
a cursory topic within the ASV field [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16]. While
ASV vulnerability caused by technical attacks is widely reported,
less (reliable) information is available on effectivess of mimicry,
due to adoption of small, proprietary datasets. The authors are fully
∗The work was supported by Academy of Finland (project no. 309629).
Public-domain 
ASV system
Public-domain 
celebrity corpus
Selected targets
and utterances
SESSION 1
Natural voice
SESSION 2
Natural voice
SESSION 3
Mimicry
Speech
transcription
Text A 
(common)
Text B 
(customized)
Text B 
(customized)
Attacked
black-box ASV
Attacked
black-box ASV
SESSION 1: Search of potential celebrities to attack.
SESSION 2: Rehearsal of target text, no mimicry.
SESSION 3: Mimicry (from transcript and audio).
Fig. 1. Automatic speaker verification (ASV) assisted mimicry at-
tack: attacker uses a public-domain ASV system to select target
speakers matched with his/her voice from a public celebrity data.
The attacker then practices target speaker mimicry, intended to at-
tack another independently developed ASV system.
aware of the difficulties in collecting mimicry data from profes-
sional artists [15], whose prevalance in the general population is
arguably very low. Nonetheless, if mimicry attacks could be shown
to be a threat to ASV, it would be conceivably challenging to devise
countermeasures: natural human speech lacks processing artifacts
that enable detection of technical attacks. Thus, we argue that it
is important to keep mimicry also in the list of potential attacks
against ASV. Of particular interest in this work are mimicry attacks
against celebrities whose voice data is available in massive amounts
in the public domain. In line with the recent EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), intended to protect the privacy of its
citizens, it is important to assess risks associated with multimedia
data in the public domain. A recent study [17] has attempted voice
cloning of celebrity voices based on found data using a pre-defined
target speaker. The cloned voice samples were, however, detectable
as spoofed speech.
We focus on technology-assisted mimicry attacks that uses ASV
itself to identify potential target speakers to be subjected to mimicry
attacks. The idea is to identify targets whose voice is similar to that
of the attacker’s voice, as this could potentially involve fewer artic-
ulatory or voice source modifications. Two related prior studies are
[12] and [18] which involve search of either targets [12] or attack-
ers [18] from a large set of candidates. The authors of [12] used a
Gaussian mixture model (GMM) system to find closest, furthest and
median targets from YOHO corpus for a few naive impersonators,
leading to substantially increased false acceptance rate. In [18], the
authors selected impersonators (rather than targets) through a com-
mercial crowd-sourcing platform based on self-judgment and further
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refinement using ASV.
Our study can be seen as an attempt to reproduce the findings
of [12] using up-to-date ASV technology and a far larger target can-
didate set (7, 365 celebrities pooled from VoxCeleb1 [19] and Vox-
Celeb2 [20]). A key methodological difference, however, is that un-
like [12] that used a single GMM recognizer, we include two differ-
ent ASV systems (Fig. 1). We argue that it may be unrealistic for
the attacker to interact many times with the targeted ASV, but he/she
may develop an offline substitute ASV that, after optimization, hope-
fully behaves similar to the attacked one. Our work bears some re-
semblance to black box attacks [21] in adversial machine learning
[6], though our adversary is not a machine learning algorithm but a
human. Further, those methods use either classifier output score or
decision to optimize the attacks, while we assume that the attacker
receives no feedback from the attacked system in any form. Thus,
we expect that such attacks are not strong, but we argue that they are
realistic given the abundance of multimedia data of celebrity speak-
ers and various public-domain ASV implementations. We seek to
answer the question in the title of this work, using a specifically col-
lected ‘attacker’ data and VoxCeleb celebrity targets.
2. ASV-ASSISTED MIMICRY ATTACKS
2.1. Attack implementation
Let T = {Tj}Jj=1 denote a set of unique, publicly known target
speaker identities and let A = {Ak}Kk=1 denote a set of attacker
identities. Given a pair of arbitrary utterances (or a pair of collec-
tions of many utterances), (Ui, Uj), a automatic speaker verifica-
tion (ASV) system (speaker detector), D(Ui, Uj) computes a score
s ∈ R with an arbitrary scale but higher relative values indicating
stronger support that the source of Ui and Uj is the same speaker.
We consider two different types of ASV systems. The first one,
attacker’s ASV (Dpub), is a public-domain, known ASV implemen-
tation, and the latter, black-box ASV (Dblack), is the system an at-
tacker attempts to spoof but whose internal workings, scores and
decisions are inaccessible to the attacker. The proposed attack pro-
ceeds as follows:
ASV-assisted mimicry attack
1. Attacker A ∈ A records his/her natural voice sample, Unat.
2. A uses Dpub to compute scores {sj}Jj=1 between Unat and
all the targets in a public database. A picks the closest tar-
get, j∗ = argmaxJj=1Dpub(Unat, Uj), where Uj contains
the known recordings of Tj .
3. A continues to use Dpub to pick the best-matching utter-
ances of Tj∗ .
4. The attacker listens to the selected utterance(s) and attempts
to adjust his/her voice towards the target. Once completed
practicing, A submits a mimicked test utterance Umimic to
Dblack(Umimic, Uj∗), the aim of being authenticated as Tj∗ .
2.2. Public-domain (attacker’s) ASV system
The attacker’s ASV uses i-vector front-end and probabilistic dis-
criminant analysis (PLDA) back-end to compute speaker similarity
scores. We extract 20 mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs)
using 20 filters1, leading to 60 features per frame after including
1http://cs.joensuu.fi/~sahid/codes/AntiSpoofing_
Features.zip
deltas and double-deltas. The features are processed with RASTA
filtering and cepstral mean and variance normalization (CMVN).
Non-speech frames are omitted using energy-based speech activity
detector (described in Section 5.1 of [22]).
To train the i-vector extractor, we compute sufficient statis-
tics using a universal background model (UBM) of 512 Gaussians.
To train the UBM, we choose randomly 10,000 speech utterances
from SI-284 subset of the Wall Street Journal corpus (WSJ0 and
WSJ1) and 10,000 speech utterances from train-clean-360
and train-clean-100 subsets of the Librispeech [23] corpus.
To train the T-matrix with 400 total factors, we randomly choose
20,000 speech utterances from the same subset of WSJ and 20,000
speech utterances from the same subset of Librispeech. Finally, the
PLDA is trained on the entire SI-284 subset (from WSJ0 and WSJ1)
and entire train-clean subset (from Librispeech) consisting 169,969
speech utterances from a total 1,455 speakers. The 400-dimensional
i-vectors are further reduced to 250 dimensions with linear dis-
criminant analysis (LDA) using the same data as in PLDA training,
followed by centering and whitening. We use a simplified PLDA
with 200-dimensional speaker subspace. We adopt MATLAB-based
MSR Identity Toolkit2 to train the attacker’s ASV.
The above development data and parameter selections are based
on preliminary ASV experiments on the AVOID corpus (collected
in [24]) and VoxCeleb (1 and 2). For the AVOID corpus, we ob-
tained EERs of 3.30% and 4.52% for text-dependent scenario with
two English sentences separately. Further, we obtained EERs of
10.50% and 16.98% for text-independent ASV on two subsets of
VoxCeleb1 and VoxCeleb2. These custom protocols were created by
randomly choosing 60 speakers from VoxCeleb1 (6,163 target and
363,617 non-target trials) and VoxCeleb2 (9,118 target and 537,962
non-target trials).
2.3. Attacked ASV systems
In our experiments, we regard x-vector systems [25] based on pre-
trained Kaldi [26] recipes as ASV systems to be attacked. To emulate
the scenario of attacker’s limited knowledge of this system, the at-
tacker’s ASV is made intentionally different from the attacked ASV
systems in terms of feature extractor set-up, embedding type, and
development corpora (Table 1). Both attacked systems are based on
Kaldi recipes for VoxCeleb and NIST Speaker Recognition Evalua-
tion 2016, while the attacker’s system uses i-vectors.
3. CORPUS OF TARGET SPEAKERS: VOXCELEB
The attacker’s ASV is used as a voice search tool to find the clos-
est speakers from the combination of VoxCeleb1 [19] and Voxceleb2
[20] to each of the locally recruited subjects (described in Section 4).
The combined VoxCeleb corpus contains about 1.3 million speech
excerpts extracted from more than 170,000 YouTube videos from
J = 7, 365 unique speakers. This totals to about 2,800 hours of au-
dio material that is, for the most part, active speech. Both VoxCeleb
corpora were collected using automated pipeline exploiting face ver-
ification and active speaker verification technologies [20].
VoxCeleb1 contains mostly English speech, while VoxCeleb2 is
more diverse in nationalities and languages. The nationality infor-
mation of the target speakers was of our interest, as the recruited
local speakers are Finnish and we wanted to see if Finnish people do
better job at imitating Finnish targets than non-Finnish. According
to the VoxCeleb1 metadata, there were no Finnish targets in Vox-
Celeb1. The VoxCeleb2 did not include nationality metadata, so we
2https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/
details.aspx?id=52279
Table 1. Details of the speaker verification systems used to simulate targeted impersonation attack against automatic speaker verification. The
attacker is assumed to not have information about the attacked systems, and hence the attacker’s system differs from the attacked systems.
Attacker’s ASV Attacked ASV 1 Attacked ASV 2
Sampling rate 16 kHz 16 kHz 8 kHz
Acoustic features 60-dimensional MFCCs (20 static+20-
∆+20-∆∆), RASTA, SAD, CMVN.
30 MFCC coeffs (no deltas), Sliding
CMN normalization
23 MFCC coeffs (no deltas), Sliding
CMN normalization
Embedding type i-vector x-vector x-vector
Back-end / scoring PLDA PLDA PLDA
Development data WSJ0 and WSJ1, Librispeech VoxCeleb2, training part of VoxCeleb1 Switchboard 2 (P. 1, 2, 3), Switchboard
Cellular, NIST SREs 04 – 10, Mixer 6
Data augmentation None Reverberation, noise, music, babble Reverberation, noise, music, babble
EER (VoxCeleb1) 12.84 (%) 3.11 (%) 9.91 (%)
made a script to automatically obtain nationalities using Google’s
Knowledge Graph API3. With this strategy we found 44 Finnish
speakers from VoxCeleb2.
4. LOCALLY RECRUITED ATTACKERS
4.1. Speakers and recording gear
We recruited K = 6 voluntary local speakers (4M + 2F) to serve
as ‘attackers’. All are native Finnish speakers and one of them is a
co-author of this study. All the six speakers, selected based on their
availability, took part in 2015 to the recordings of [24], currently
under release with the name AVOID corpus4. We adopt the same
recording setup and part of text prompts from [24] but otherwise the
two studies are unrelated. All the subjects signed an informed con-
sent form to use their speech data for research, and were rewarded
with movie and coffee tickets. Two of the male subjects knew the
specific goals of our study while the remaining four subjects were
not informed that the text and target speakers were tailored for them,
nor where do the voices originate from. They were not informed
that the study relates to ASV vulnerability, but were merely asked to
mimic the targets as accurately as they could.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, the subjects took part to three recording
sessions. The first session, produced in the subject’s natural voice,
is used for VoxCeleb target speaker selection, while the remaining
two sessions serve for vulnerability analysis of the attacked systems.
The tasks in the recording sessions differed, while the recording set-
up was the same: recordings took place in a silent laboratory room
with a portable Zoom H6 Handy Recorder using an omnidirectional
headset mic (Glottal Enterprises M80) with 44.1 kHz sampling and
16-bit quantization. Three other channels (two smartphones, elec-
troglottograph) were also collected, but are not used in this study.
4.2. The first recording session (data for target search)
The first session, used for the targeted VoxCeleb speaker search, con-
sists of four tasks in the speaker’s natural voice. The tasks consisted
of spontaneous speech and read text (13 sentences) in both Finnish
and English. The read texts in Finnish are the same used in [24]
and their corresponding English versions were added for this study.
We have approximately 6 minutes of speech (before speech activity
detection) per speaker from Session 1.
4.3. Attacked target speaker search and utterance selection
For the purpose of targeted speaker search, we compute a single av-
eraged i-vector for each of the six speakers resulting from 28 indi-
vidual utterances from Session 1. Similar to [12], we use the ASV
system to pick for each attacker the closest, median, and furthest
3https://developers.google.com/knowledge-graph/
4http://urn.fi/urn:nbn:fi:lb-2018060621
speakers among the VoxCeleb speakers. The closest one is most rel-
evant for vulnerability analysis while the other two serve for refer-
ence purposes. We do this ASV-assisted search separately for all the
VoxCeleb speakers (unconstrained search from 7,365 speakers) and
for the subset of 44 Finnish speakers. We pool all the speech data of
the VoxCeleb speakers to compute average i-vector per target.
In addition to the three ASV-selected targets, we include com-
mon target matched with the speaker’s gender, in both Finnish and
English. The common Finnish targets are Päivi Räsänen (F, politi-
cian) and Ilkka Kanerva (M, politician), and the common English
targets are Hillary R. Clinton (F, politician) and Leonardo DiCaprio
(M, actor). Even if well-known persons, from the viewpoint of ASV
they are random targets with no strong presuppositions how similar
their voices are to our attackers.
In summary, for each of our 4 male and 2 female subjects, we
select 6 customized targets (3 ASV-ranks× 2 languages) and 2 com-
mon gender-matched ones (one Finnish, one English). This gives a
theoretical total of 3 × 2 × 4male + 2 common male + 3 × 2 ×
2 female + 2 common female = 40 target speakers. Not all of
the ASV-selected targets are unique, however: one male Finnish
celebrity was the closest target for three attackers, one male Finnish
celebrity repeated as the median speaker for two male attackers, and
one female Finnish celebrity is the furthest speaker for the two fe-
male attackers. The final number of unique celebrity targets is 36.
For each of the 36 target speakers, we selected at minimum 30
seconds of active speech to evaluate the ASV system attacks. This
duration of speech was collected from multiple shorter utterances for
two reasons: First, the segments in VoxCeleb corpora are typically
about 5 to 10 seconds long. Secondly, as we were going to ask the
recruited attackers to imitate the target speakers, shorter utterances
would be easier to impersonate.
We utilized Attacker’s ASV also for the utterance selection. For
the closest targets, we selected the highest scoring utterances, while
for the furthest targets, the utterances with the lowest scores where
selected. For the median speakers, we selected the utterances close
to mean. This was further accompanied by manual inspection: if the
audio quality (determined subjectively by listening) was not deemed
high enough, we discarded it and moved on to the next ones in the
ranked list.
4.4. Speech transcription and the mimicry recordings
Unlike the first recording session (common to all subjects), the sec-
ond and third sessions were customized for each subject. This pro-
cess involves the use of speech transcripts of the selected target utter-
ances. To this end, we used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk5 (MTurk),
a commercial crowdsourcing service, to transcribe the English lan-
guage audio. The Finnish transcripts were produced by two native
5https://www.mturk.com/
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Fig. 2. Comparison of attackers’ ASV scores (log likelihood ratios) to the targets’ scores for all the three ASV systems involved in the study.
The scores are averaged over all attackers and all speech segments. The error bars represent 95 % confidence intervals for the means.
Finnish speakers. The 35 MTurk crowdworkers and the 2 Finnish
transcribers were asked to transcribe all the nuances of conversa-
tional speech, including repetitions, hesitations, filler words etc. Fi-
nally, two reviewers audited the quality of all the transcripts.
In Session 2, which took place 5 to 6 weeks after Session 1, the
subject was provided with the transcripts of the selected target ut-
terance(s) and was asked to read the sentences twice in his or her
natural voice. The speaker was not informed whose speech the tran-
scripts corresponded to; even the coauthor taking part to the study
was unaware whose transcripts he was reading. The rationale of in-
cluding this session was to familiarize each attacker with the target
speaker sentences. We adopted the general idea to include a session
with reference text only and another one with audio from the design
used in [13].
In the last session, which took place 2 to 6 days after Session 2,
the subjects were provided with the same transcript as in Session 2,
but in addition they had now access to the actual target speaker audio
excerpts played through headphones. The transcripts were provided
on a printed paper and the audio reference from a tablet computer
that the subject was able to interact with; he/she could play the target
utterance(s) as many times as needed, and he/she then tried to mimic
the voice according to their best skills. Again, the subject was asked
to mimic each sentence twice. In the experiments, we use only the
second recording of each sentence.
5. RESULTS
In the following, we evaluate effectiveness of the mimicry attacks.
The target speaker models used in the experiments were enrolled
using all available segments except those selected for testing as de-
scribed in Section 4.3.
Figure 2 displays how the attacker’s PLDA scores compare to
the target scores. The general findings are as expected. First, the
order of the closest, the median, and the furthest speakers transfers
from the attacker’s ASV system to the attacked ASV systems imply-
ing that the ASV-assisted speaker selection can help in ASV attacks.
Second, in general, the mimicry attempts were not successful as the
attacker’s natural and mimicry scores are significantly (and substan-
tially) below the target scores. Additionally, we find no significant
difference between the natural and impersonated versions. Finally,
as the recruited attackers were Finnish, attackers’ scores against the
Finnish targets were higher than for non-Finnish targets.
To look at the effect of mimicry closer, we analyze the differ-
ence of mimicked and natural speech scores (Table 2). Interestingly,
and contradictory to what we assumed, if the target speaker’s voice
is already close to the attacker’s voice, the impersonation attempts
degrade the score. The same finding was noted in situations where
the target is a well known public figure like the targets in the com-
mon category are. We suspect that the effect might be due to people
Table 2. Score differences between attacks with impersonated
voices and attacks with natural voices. Differences are averaged
over attackers, target nationalities, and utterances. ± indicates 95
% confidence intervals. In the case of the closest target speakers,
impersonation attempts are counterproductive.
ASV system Closest Median Furthest Common
Attacker -9.7± 5.2 2.2 ± 4.3 5.9 ± 7.1 -7.2± 4.3
Attacked1 -5.2± 3.9 9.2 ± 3.3 6.1 ± 4.3 -0.5± 3.8
Attacked2 -3.7± 5.5 15.0 ± 7.0 4.7 ± 7.4 -4.0± 7.7
having higher tendency to overact someone they already know well.
However, in the case of the targets that are not close to the attackers
and, on average, are not so well known (median and furthest cate-
gories), impersonation is helpful. Figure 3 shows a sample of the
best and worst attackers for the common targets, with similar find-
ings as above.
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Our attackers are native Finnish speakers recorded with a spe-
cific set-up which could be different from the VoxCeleb conditions.
This raises a question whether our mimicry attacks were unsuccess-
ful simply due to domain mismatch. To address this concern, we
ran an additional experiment, in which we scored attacker’s test seg-
ments against attacker’s own speaker models. If our ASV systems
are able to cope with domain mismatch, we expect high detection
scores similar to the VoxCeleb target scores). The results shown in
Figure 4 confirm this as, similarly to Figure 2, the averaged log like-
lihood ratios are close to 50 for the attacked ASV system 1. From
Figure 4 we also find that impersonation lowers the scores, show-
ing that the ASV system is not robust against disguise (the act of
attempting to be not recognized as oneself). This finding was not a
surprise to us [24].
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Fig. 4. Attacker’s scores in the case where attacker’s test sentences
are tested against attackers’ own speaker models instead targets’
speaker models as in Figure 2.
6. CONCLUSION
Can one use ASV technology to attack itself? To answer this, we col-
lected 6 native Finnish mimics and used ASV to locate customized
targets from VoxCeleb. Our preliminary analysis reveals that, un-
like in [12], our mimicry attempts were unsuccessful. In fact, the
ASV scores even degraded, specifically when the impersonator’s
natural voice was already close to the target speaker’s voice. Fur-
ther work is required to analyze the reasons, specifically in terms
of acoustic modifications implemented by our naive impersonators.
The relative ordering of the closest, median and furthest speaker was,
however, preserved across the attacker’s and attacked ASV systems,
with higher relative scores obtained for Finnish targets. Though our
assisted attacks did not succeeed to spoof state-of-the-art x-vector
technology, selection of imposters from a larger set of speakers (e.g.
using crowd-sourcing [18]) may help in spoofing ASV systems.
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